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Abstract
We study a competitive multiline insurance industry, in which insurance companies
with limited liability choose which insurance lines to cover and the amount of capital
to hold. Premiums are determined by no-arbitrage option pricing methods. The results
are developed under the realistic assumptions that insurers face friction costs in holding
capital and that the losses created by insurer default are shared among policyholders
following an ex post, pro rata, sharing rule. In general, the equilibrium ratios of premiums
to expected claims and of default costs to expected claims will vary across insurance lines.
We characterize the situations in which monoline and multiline insurance oﬀerings will
be optimal. Insurance lines characterized by a large number of essentially independent
risks will be oﬀered by very large multiline ﬁrms. Insurance lines for which the risks are
asymmetric or correlated may be oﬀered by monoline insurers. The results are illustrated
with examples.
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11 Background
The optimal allocation of risk in an insurance market was studied in the seminal work of
Borch (1962), who showed that without frictions a Pareto eﬃcient outcome can be reached.
Furthermore, in a friction-free setting, insurers can hold suﬃcient capital to guarantee they
will pay all claims. Two frictions, however, appear to be important in practice: 1) excess costs
to holding capital, leading insurers to conserve the amount of capital they hold, and 2) limited
liability, creating conditions under which insurers may fail to make payments to policyholders.
When markets are incomplete, in the sense that policyholders face a counterparty risk that
cannot be independently hedged, the existence of the two frictions can have a signiﬁcant
impact on the industry equilibrium, including the amount of capital held, the premiums
set across insurance lines, and the industry structure regarding which insurance lines are
associated with monoline versus multiline insurers.
In special cases, the impact of such frictions may be negligible and a no-frication — perfect
market — approach approach is warranted. Such an approach is for example taken in Phillips,
Cummins, and Allen (1998) (henceforth denoted PCA), in which no costs are associated with
collateral, and markets are assumed to be complete. However, in many cases, the no friction
assumption may be too simplistic. It is generally more realistic to presume that frictions do
exist and that they may have an important impact on the equilibrium. For example, Froot,
Scharsfstein, and Stein (1993) emphasize the importance of capital market imperfections for
understanding a variety of corporate risk management decisions, with the tax disadvantages
to holding capital within a ﬁrm an especially common and important factor. For insurance
ﬁrms, Merton and Perold (1993), Jaﬀee and Russell (1997), Cummins (1993), Myers and
Read (2001), and Froot (2007) all emphasize the importance of various accounting, agency,
informational, regulatory, and tax factors in raising the cost of internally held capital.
The risk of insurer default in paying policyholder claims has lead to the imposition of
strong regulatory constraints on the insurance industry in most countries. Capital require-
ments are one common form of regulation, although there is no systematic framework for
determining the appropriate levels. As Cummins (1993) and Myers and Read (2001) point
out, it is likely that the capital requirements are being set too high in some jurisdictions
and too low in others, and similarly for the various lines of insurance risk, in both cases
leading to ineﬃciency. It is thus important to have an objective framework for identifying
the appropriate level of capital based on each insurer’s particular book of business.
Insurance regulation also focuses on the industry structure, requiring certain high-risk
insurance lines to be provided on a monoline basis. Monoline restrictions require that each
insurer dedicate its capital to pay claims on its monoline of business, thus eliminating the
diversiﬁcation beneﬁt in which a multiline ﬁrm can apply its capital to pay claims on any
and all of its insurance lines.1 Jaﬀee (2006), for example, describes the monoline restrictions
1Monoline restrictions do not preclude an insurance holding company from owning an amalgam of both
monoline and multiline subsidiaries. The intent of monoline restrictions is that the capital of a monoline
division must be dedicated to paying claims from that division alone.
2imposed on the mortgage insurance industry, an industry, as it happens, currently at sig-
niﬁcant risk to default on its obligations as a result of the subprime mortgage crisis. Jaﬀee
conjectures that the monoline restrictions were imposed as consumer legislation to protect
the policyholders on relatively safe lines from an insurer default that would be created from
large losses on a line with more catastrophic risks. It is thus valuable to have a framework
in which the optimality of monoline versus multiline formats can be determined.
Although this paper is developed in the context of an insurance market, we believe the
framework will be applicable to the issues of counterparty risk and monoline structures that
are pervasive throughout the ﬁnancial services industry. For example, the 1933 Glass Steagall
Act forced US commercial banks to divest their investment bank divisions, while the 1956
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 similarly separated commercial banking from the insur-
ance industry; both Acts, repealed in 1999, were in eﬀect monoline restrictions. In a similar
fashion, Leland (2007) develops a model in which single-activity corporations can choose the
optimal debt to equity ratio, whereas multiline conglomerates obtain a diversiﬁcation beneﬁt
but can only choose an average debt to equity ratio for the overall ﬁrm.
This paper provides a detailed analysis of the structure of an insurance market under the
assumptions of costly capital, limited liability, incomplete markets and perfect competition
between insurance companies. We speciﬁcally focus on the following questions:
1. Premia: For an insurance company oﬀering insurance in multiple insurance lines, what
will be the price structure across lines?
2. Cost allocation: For an insurance company oﬀering insurance in multiple insurance
lines, how should the ﬁrm allocate costs between these lines?
3. Choice of insurance lines: How will ﬁrms choose the basket of insurance lines to oﬀer
to their customers?
4. Choice of capital: Given a choice of insurance lines, what level of capital will an insur-
ance company choose?
We introduce a consistent model to analyze each of these questions. Our results signiﬁ-
cantly extend and generalize the analyses in earlier papers, e.g., in Phillips, Cummins, and
Allen (1998) and Myers and Read (2001). Three factors lead to these diﬀerences. First, we
consider a competitive market, in which insurance companies (insurers) compete to attract
risk averse agents who wish to insure risks (insurees). This competition severely restricts the
monoline and multiline structures that may exist in equilibrium.
Second, we rely on the existence of a pricing kernel to price any risk,2 but we make the
additional assumption that insurees cannot replicate the insurance payoﬀs by trading in the
2In most parts of the paper, the pricing kernel can be quite general, although in some parts we will make
the additional assumption that individual agents risks are idiosyncratic, so that the pricing operator coincides
with the discounted objective expectations operator.
3market.3 This restriction implies that the insurance company provides value by tailoring
insurance products that are optimal for its customers. Without the restriction, the insurance
company is redundant — since any payoﬀ can be replicated by trading in the asset market
— and therefore the structure of the industry would be indeterminate.
Third, in the case of insurer bankruptcy, we assume that the insurer’s available assets
are distributed to the policyholders following what we call the ex post pro rata rule. Under
this rule, the available assets are allocated to policyholder claims based on each claimant’s
share of the total claims. This rule has sensible properties and generally reﬂects the actual
practice.4
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we give a review of related literature. In
section 3, we introduce the basic framework for our analysis. In section 4, we analyze the
ﬁrst two questions — the pricing and cost allocation across lines in the case when the amount
of capital and the choice of insurance lines is given. In section 5, we analyze the monoline
versus multiline choice and the implications for industry structure. We analyze the insurance
line choices in a competitive market from two angles: In what we denote the traditional case,
there are many, essentially independent, risks available: In this case, insurance companies
will be massively multiline oriented. In contrast, in what we call the nontraditional case,t h e
market may be best served by monoline insurance companies. This may occur if there are a
few lines, if losses between lines are highly correlated, or if loss distributions between lines
are asymmetric. Finally, section 6 makes some concluding remarks.
2 Literature review
Financial models of insurance pricing and capital allocation were ﬁrst developed by applying
the principles of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM, see, for example, Fairley (1979) and
Hill (1979)), or a discounted cash ﬂow model (see, for example, Myers and Cohn (1987)).
Both models, however, have signiﬁcant drawbacks. The CAPM applications have the basic
problem that they fail to incorporate the default risk faced by policyholders as a result of the
insurance ﬁrms limited liability. The CAPM is also not well suited to pricing risks with heavy
tails, as would be plausible for various lines of catastrophic disasters and terrorist attacks.
The discount cash ﬂow models must apply a risk-adjusted discount rate, but the derivations
of this rate incorporate neither the frictional costs of holding capital nor the default risk for
policyholders.
A major advance occurred by applying option valuation methods to the questions of in-
surance pricing and capital allocation, starting with the monoline models of Doherty and
Garven (1986) and Cummins (1988). These papers specify the default risk faced by policy-
holders as a put option held by the equity owners of the insurer. The value of the option
3This could be because ﬁrms aggregate several sources of risks, and the market thereby is incomplete. It
could also be that insurees do not have access to the stock market, or even that they are not sophisticated
enough construct replicating portfolios in an asset market.
4This assumption seems to reﬂect the contracts oﬀered to insurees in practice, as discussed below.
4depends on the range of possible outcomes for policy claims and the amount of capital held
by the insurer (which is the strike price of the option). The premium is then determined as
the expected losses on the policy line minus the value of the default option. In other words,
the ratio of the premium to the expected claim is less than 1, since the claims are not always
paid in full.
The extension of option pricing methods to a multiline insurer was ﬁrst provided by
Phillips, Cummins, and Allen (1998) (PCA). Their analysis embeds the simplifying assump-
tion that claims for all the lines are realized at the same date, which has the very useful
implication that insurer default is simultaneously determined for all insurance lines. If the
insurers assets equal or exceed the actual policyholder claims, then all claims are paid in full.
Whereas, if the actual claims exceed the available assets, the insurer defaults, and pro rated
payments are made to policyholders following a loss allocation rule. The speciﬁc rule used
by PCA is that each policyholder is allocated a share of the shortfall based on the amount
of her initially expected claims relative to the total of all initially expected claims. Since the
shortfall shares are based on the expected claims as of the initial date, we will refer to this
as the ex ante rule.
The PCA ex ante allocation rule implies that the premium to expected claims ratio will be
constant across lines, since the default cost relative to expected claims is constant across lines.
While this result is very powerful, the ex ante rule is a very special case, with the undesirable
feature that the allocation of the shortfall in case of default is allocated to policyholders
on the basis of only the aggregate shortfall and the initially expected loss on each insurance
policy. In other words, the amount of the shortfall allocated to a policyholder depends only on
her expected loss and is independent of that policyholders actual claims. Since the expected
claims are not observable in the market, policyholders would have no basis to validate the
share of the shortfall imposed on them. Moreover, policyholders with small expected losses
would have to make payments to other policyholders with larger expected losses.
Mahul and Wright (2004) note that while an ex ante allocation rule may lead to optimal
risk sharing among policyholders, in practice ex post payments from policyholders to other
policyholders will be diﬃcult to enforce.5 Instead, in our model as explained below, we apply
an ex post pro rata rule in which policyholders share the default shortfall in proportion to
their actual claims. The result is that claimants always receive some net payment from the
insurer, albeit less than their total claim when the insurer defaults.
How to allocate capital within a multiline insurer is another important question. PCA
take the position that the allocation of capital is not needed for price determination when
the insurance is sold in informationally eﬃcient, competitive insurance markets. In our case,
however, the frictional costs of holding capital make it imperative to allocate capital in
order to determine the appropriate insurance premiums across lines. Two studies have been
undertaken to work on this problem, Merton and Perold (1993) and Myers and Read (2001).
5The proper rule for allocating the default shortfall is related to the question of optimal contract design
when insurer default may occur. Mahul and Wright (2004) is the most recent contribution to the small
literature that discusses this issue, which also includes Schlesinger (2000) and Doherty and Schlesinger (1990).
5In both cases, the amount of capital to be allocated to an insurance line is determined by
an experiment in which the size of each line is changed and a computation is made of the
resulting change in capital if the ﬁrms overall risk is to be constant.
The Merton and Perold (MP) experiment, more precisely, entirely removes an insurance
line from the multiline ﬁrm and then computes the reduction in the insurers total capital
requirements. The resulting reduction in capital is interpreted as the capital amount to be
allocated when that line is part of the multiline ﬁrm. This procedure is then repeated for each
line that the insurer covers. The MP method has the attribute that the sum of the capital
allocations across all the lines will be less than the total capital required of the ﬁrm when
it oﬀers all the lines. The reason is that the overall ﬁrm receives a beneﬁt of diversiﬁcation
that cannot be allocated to any of the individual lines.
The Myers and Read (MR) model also uses a marginal method to compute the capital
allocation, but instead of removing each entire line from the total, they change the coverage
amount of each line only be small incremental amounts. MR demonstrate that the capital
allocations determined by their incremental technique satisfy the adding constraint whereby
the sum of the capital allocations exactly equals the total amount of capital to be allocated.
Our model, as developed below, applies the same concept for determining capital allocations
and takes advantage of the same adding up condition. Our results diﬀer from MR, however,
because the MR computations are based on the PCA model’s ex ante allocation rule for
insurer shortfalls, whereas our results are developed on the basis of our ex post allocation
rule.6
The last major topic considered in this paper is the determination of the industry structure
in terms of which insurance lines are eﬃciently provided by monoline versus multiline insurers.
We know of no papers that have considered this question within an analytic framework.
3 A competitive multiline insurance market
We ﬁrst study the case of only one insured risk class. Consider the following one-period
model of a competitive insurance market. At t =0 ,a ninsurer (i.e., an insurance company)
in a competitive insurance market sells insurance against a risk, ˜ L ≥ 0,7 to an insuree.8 The
expected loss of the risk is μL = E[˜ L], μL < ∞.
The insurer has limited liability and reserves capital within the company, so that A is
available at t = 1, at which point losses are realized and the insurer satisﬁes all claims by
paying ˜ L to the insuree, as long as ˜ L ≤ A. But, if ˜ L>A ,t h ei n s u r e rp a y sA and defaults
6Zanjani provides are alternative approach to premium setting and capital allocation when there is default
risk by specifying that the demand for insurance depends in part on the quality of the insurer. Although this
approach can provide general conclusions comparable to the PCA and MR models, it lacks the quantitative
precision that is provided by the default option approach. For our paper, this attribute of the option approach
is critical in determining the optimal industry structure between monoline and multiline insurers.
7Throughout the paper we use the convention that losses take on positive values.
8It is natural to think of each risk as an insurance line.
6the additional amount that is due. Thus, the payment is
Payment=m i n (˜ L,A)=˜ L − max(˜ L − A,0) = ˜ L − ˜ Q(A),
where ˜ Q(A)=m a x ( ˜ L − A,0), i.e., ˜ Q(A) is the payoﬀ to the option the insurer has to
default.9 The price for the insurance is P. Throughout the paper, the risk-free discount rate
is normalized to zero.10
We assume that there are friction costs when holding capital within an insurer, including
both taxation and liquidity costs.11 The cost is δ per unit of capital. This means that to
ensure that A is available at t =1 ,( 1+δ) × A needs to be reserved at t =0 .
There is a friction-free complete market for risk, admitting no arbitrage. The price for ˜ L
risk in the market is
PL = Price
 
˜ L
 
= E∗[˜ L]=E[˜ m × ˜ L],
where Priceis a linear pricing function, which can be represented by the risk-neutral expecta-
tions operator E∗[·], or with the state-price kernel, ˜ m, in the objective probability measure,12
and we assume that E∗[˜ L] < ∞. Similarly, the price of the option to default is
PQ = Price
 
˜ Q(A)
 
= E∗[ ˜ Q(A)] = E[˜ m × ˜ L].
Since the market is competitive and the cost of holding capital is δA, the price charged for
the insurance is
P = PL − PQ + δA. (1)
To ensure that A is available at t = 1, the additional amount of A − PL + PQ needs to be
reserved by the insurer. The total market structure is summarized in Figure 1, which also
shows how noarbitrage pricing in the market for risk determines the price for insurance in
the competitive insurance market.
It is natural to ask why insurees would impose the costs of holding capital by buying
from an insurer instead of going directly to the market for risk. We make the assumption
that insurees do not have direct access to the market for risk and that they can only insure
through the insurers.13
The generalization to the case when there are multiple risk classes is straightforward. If
9When obvious, we suppress the A dependence, e.g., writing ˜ Q instead of ˜ Q(A).
10The results are qualitatively the same with a non-zero risk-free rate.
11Jaﬀee and Russell (1997) discuss a variety of costs that arise regarding insurer capital, including a risk
of ﬁrm takeover as well as liquidity and tax costs. Myers and Read (2001) and and Cummins (1993) make
similar assumptions.
12See, e.g., Duﬃe (2001) for standard results on existence and uniqueness of pricing functions under these
completeness and noarbitrage assumptions.
13For example, if we think of the market for risk as a reinsurance market, this may be a natural constraint.
A similar assumption, which would lead to identical results, is if the insuree faces costs that are equal to or
higher than the costs faced by the insurer, in which case it will be optimal to buy from the insurer. Finally, if
the market is incomplete and the insurer is risk-neutral, there may be no way to replicate the payoﬀs in the
market for risk, leaving the insurance market as the sole market available for the insuree.
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Figure 1: Structure of model. Insurers can invest in market for risk or in a competitive insurance
market. There is costly capital, so to ensure that A is available at t =0 , (1+δ)A needs to be reserved
at t =1 . The premium, δA+PL −PQ, is contributed by the insuree and A−PL +PQ by the insurer.
The discount rate is normalized to zero. Noarbitrage and competitive market conditions imply that
the price for insurance is P = δA+ PL − PQ.
coverage against N risks is provided by one multiline insurer, the total payment made to all
policyholders with claims, taking into account that the insurer may default, is
TotalPayment= ˜ L +m a x (˜ L − A,0) = ˜ L − ˜ Q(A),
where ˜ L =
 
i ˜ Li and ˜ Q(A)=m a x ( ˜ L − A,0). The total price for the risks is, P
def =
 
i Pi,
where Pi is the price for insurance against risk i, is once again on the form (1).
Now consider an insurance market, in which M insurers sell insurance against N ≥ M
risks. We partition the total set of N risks into X = {X1,X 2,...,X M},w h e r e∪iXi =
{1,...,N}, Xi ∩Xj = ∅,i = j, Xi  = ∅. The partition represents how the risks are insured by
M monoline or multiline insurance businesses. The total industry structure is then charac-
terized by the duple, S =( X,A), where A ∈ RM
+ is a vector with i:th element representing
the capital available in the multiline business that insures the risks for agents in Xi.14 The
number of sets in the partition is denoted by M(X). Two two polar cases are the fully multi-
line industry structure, with X = {{0,1,...,N}} and the monoline industry structure, with
X = {{0},{1},...,{N}}
Our analysis so far is thus based on the following assumptions:
1. Market completeness: The market for risk is arbitrage-free and complete, such that
14We use the notation R+ = {x ∈ R : x ≥ 0} and R− = {x ∈ R : x ≤ 0}.
8there is a linear pricing operator.
2. Limited liability: Insurers have limited liability.
3. Costly capital: There is a cost for insurers to hold capital.
4. Competitive insurance markets: Prices for insurance are set competitively.
5. Access to markets: Insurees do not have direct access to the market for risk.
These assumptions completely determine the pricing of risk and cost allocation between
diﬀerent lines, as shown in section 4.
To understand the prevailing market structure, S =( X,A), in an economy – the objective
of section 5 – we also need assumptions about insurees. For simplicity, we assume that there
are N distinct insurees. Each risk is insured by one insuree with expected utility utility
function u,w h e r eu is a strictly concave, increasing function deﬁned on the whole of R−.
For some of the results we need to make stronger conditions on u.15 The risk can not be
divided between multiple insurers.16 Finally, we assume that expected utility, U, is ﬁnite,
U = Eu(−˜ L) > −∞.
We will make extensive use of the certainty equivalent as the measure of the size of a risk.
For a speciﬁc utility function, u, the certainty equivalent of risk ˜ L, CEu(−˜ L) ∈ R is deﬁned
such that u(CEu(−˜ L)) = E[u(−˜ L)], where E[·] is the (objective) expectations operator.
Finally, we will assume that the risks are idiosyncratic, i.e., that risk-neutral expectations
coincide with objective expectations, E∗[·] ≡ E[·].
To summarize, in section 5, the following additional assumptions are made:
6. Risk-averse insurees: Insurees are risk averse.
7. Nondivisibility: Risks are nondivisible.
8. Idiosyncratic risks: The insurance risks are idiosyncratic, i.e., the risk-neutral expecta-
tions operator coincides with the objective expectations operator.
For many types of individual and natural disaster risks, such as auto and earthquake in-
surance, etc., this seems a reasonable assumption, although, of course, there will be some
mega-disasters and corporate risks for which it is not true.
15We do not distinguish between lines of risks and individual risks, for simplicity assuming that there is one
insuree within each line. Obviously, so far this is no restriction, since, in principle, N can be very large. If
we wish to study a case with a “small” N, for the special case when there are several identical agents with
perfectly correlated risks, we can treat such a situation as there being one representative insuree facing one
risk, collapsing many risks into one line. In case of many i.i.d. risks a similar argument may be made.
16Such insurances are seldom seen in practice; maybe because of the agency problems that would prevail
between insurers when handling split insurance claims.
94 Pricing and cost allocation
We now turn to the insurer’s main question, how costs are allocated and premiums are set
across insurance lines (questions 1 and 2 in the introduction). For the time being, we assume
that the cost of holding capital is zero, δ = 0, and focus on premium setting, i.e., how the
total premium, P should be split between the insurees.
What is missing is a rule for how payments are shared between claim-holders in case of
default. There are obviously many such rules, but a minimal set of consistency requirements
is
Condition 1 Consistency requirement:
1. In case of no default: The payment to each insuree is exactly the amount claimed:
Paymenti = ˜ Li.
2. In case of default: The payment to each insuree is bounded above by the claim, and
below by zero: 0 ≤ Paymenti ≤ ˜ Li.
3. No-claim policy: Insurees with no claims do not receive payments: ˜ Li =0⇒ Paymenti =
0.
4. Linearity: If ˜ L1,...,˜ LN is insured, with capital A, leading to payments
(Payment1,...,Payment N), then insurance against risks c˜ L1,...,c˜ LN, with capital
c × A leads to payments (c × Payment1,...,c× PaymentN) for all c>0.
We deviate from the optimal contracting setting here, in that we focus on contracts that are
present in practice. If more general contracts are possible, it may for example be optimal
to have ex post transfers from claimants who did not impose any losses to claimants who
did; such contracts, which would eﬀectively turn the insuree into an insurer in some states
of the world, do not seem to exist in practice. It is out of the scope of this paper to analyze
why such contracts are rarely seen — we refer to existing literature, e.g., Mahul and Wright
(2004).
We ﬁrst focus on an ex post pro rata sharing rule that speciﬁes that:
Paymenti =
˜ Li
˜ L
× TotalPayment= ˜ Li − ˜ Li ×
˜ Q(A)
˜ L
, (2)
i.e., in case of default the insurees share the total payments according to their fraction of
total losses. In this case, the market price for insurance in line i is
Pi = PLi − Price
 
˜ Li ×
˜ Q(A)
˜ L
 
. (3)
10It is easy to check that the ex post sharing rule satisﬁes the consistency condition. More-
over, it seems to correspond well to the rules used in practice.17 An important variable is
the default value fraction, ri, i.e., the fraction of the default option value that is allocated to
line i:
ri
def = Price
 
˜ Li
˜ L
×
˜ Q(A)
PQ
 
. (4)
Per deﬁnition, we have
 
i ri =1 ,a n dt h edefault value per unit of risk for line i, zi,i st h e n
zi
def =
riPQ
PLi
=
1
PLi
× Price
 
˜ Li
˜ Li
× ˜ Q(A)
 
. (5)
Equation (3) can then be written
Pi = PLi − riPQ, (6)
and we have
Pi
PLi
=1− zi, (7)
where Pi
PLi
is the premium-to-liability ratio as deﬁned in Phillips, Cummins, and Allen (1998).
Clearly, the premium-to-liability ratio may vary with i under the ex post sharing rule (veriﬁed
in an example in the appendix). Equation (6) is the fundamental equation for how premiums
will be set.
An alternative expression for the premium-to-liability ratio, using the state price kernel
kernel, ˜ m,i s
Pi
PLi
=1− zi =1−
1
PLi
× E
 
˜ m ×
˜ Li
˜ L
× ˜ Q(A)
 
, (8)
from which we see that zi will be larger for risks that tend to make up a large fraction of total
losses in the states of the world when a company defaults, and for risks that are positively
correlated with the market. This leads to:
Implication 1
• For risks that are not related to market risk, with losses that tend to be large in states
of the world in which the insurer defaults, premium-to-liability ratios will be low.
• For risks that are not related to market risk, with losses that tend to small in states of
the world in which the insurer defaults, premium-to-liability ratios will be high.
17For example, see National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Insurer Receivership Model Act,
October 2007. An ex-post payout rule is also speciﬁed in the contracts oﬀered by the California Earthquake
Authority for circumstances in which the Authority has insuﬃcient resources all of its claims. See also (Mahul
and Wright 2004) for a discussion of alternative payoﬀ rules and the complications created by rules other than
ex-post prorated payments.
11• For risks that have high correlation with market risk, premium-to-liability ratios will be
low.
• For risks that have low correlation with market risk, premium-to-liability ratios will be
low.
These implications are diﬀerent than the predictions in Phillips, Cummins, and Allen (1998).
According to PCA (Hypothesis 2, page 609), the default premium should be constant across
lines.18
The source behind these diﬀerences is that PCA’s results are based on an ex ante sharing
rule, in which the default option value is allocated between lines according to the value of the
default-free claim at t = 0 (instead of according to the realized values at t =1 ) . T h ep a y m e n t
under the ex ante sharing rule is
Paymenti = ˜ Li −
PLi
PL
× ˜ Q(A), (9)
and it is easy to check that in this case
zi =
PQ
PL
, and
Pi
PLi
=1−
PQ
PL
, (10)
which do not vary with i. This is equation (18) in PCA (assuming that discount rate and
inﬂation are 0). We also note that the ex ante sharing rule through (10) implies that
ri =
PLi
PL
, (11)
which, in general, is diﬀerent from (4). As we have argued, we believe that, in practice, ex
post sharing rules are more common. Moreover, the ex ante rule will in general not satisfy
the consistency condition:
Implication 2 The ex post sharing rule satisﬁes the consistency condition, whereas the ex
ante sharing rule, in general, does not.
In the appendix, we introduce a simple example that emphasizes the diﬀerence between the
two sharing rules, and that violates consistency for the ex ante sharing rule.
We now turn to question 2, how capital, A, and costs, δA, should be allocated between
business lines. Our analysis is along the lines of Myers and Read (2001), which is also based
18PCA assume that δ = 0 — an assumption that we will relax in subsequent analysis. However, their model
is also more general: It is dynamic and includes an inﬂation premium, as well as risky processes for the returns
of A over time. Our model could be generalized along such lines, but the sources to the diﬀerences between
our and PCA’s approach are not related to these factors, which is why we can keep our analysis simple.
12on an ex ante sharing rule, but since we assume an ex post sharing rule, our results are
d i ﬀ e r e n t .F o rt h et i m eb e i n g ,w ek e e pa s s u m i n gt h a tδ =0 .
In general, we wish to allocate the assets A among lines, A =
 
i Ai =
 
i viA,w h e r evi
is the relative asset allocation. As showed in Myers and Read (2001), any allocation rule, vi,
(
 N
i=1 vi = 1) implies a “summing up” relationship, i.e., if we study insurance portfolios
 
i
qi˜ Li,
then the payout of the default option is
˜ Qq =m a x
 
 
i
qi(−˜ Li − viAi),0
 
,
and the summing up rule states that
 
i
qi
∂ ˜ Qq
∂qi
≡ ˜ Qq
in all states of the world, for all q1,...,q N > 0 (we show how the rule arises in the appendix;
the argument is similar to Myers and Read (2001)).
The rule immediately implies that
 
i
qi
∂PQq
∂qi
= PQq.
However, this in turn implies that the marginal price of buying one extra unit of ˜ Li risk, at
q1 = q2 = ···=1 ,i s
Pi = PLi −
∂PQq
∂qi
. (12)
Therefore, using the deﬁnition of ri, we can conclude that any cost allocation rule leads to
the allocation of relative default option value
ri =
∂PQq/∂qi
PQ
. (13)
So far, we have made no restrictions on the vi’s except for that they should sum to one.
However, as shown in the appendix, consistency requires that there is bijection, R : {ri}↔
{vi}, between relative asset allocations, vi, (satisfying
 
i vi = 1) and allocation of relative
default option values, ri’s, (also satisfying
 
i ri = 1), so that given ri’s, the vi’s are uniquely
deﬁned. Any other formula will lead to mispricing in the existing lines. We note that vi
also determines the surplus allocations: Si = viA − PLi and thereby the relative surplus
allocations, si
def = Si/PLi = A vi
PLi
− 1.
It is shown in the appendix that the correct choice under the ex post sharing rule takes
13the particularly simple form vi = ri,i=1 ,...,N. This is our fundamental formula for how
capital and costs should be allocated to diﬀerent lines, which we formulate in the following
Implication 3 For δ =0 ,i fa nex post sharing rule is used, then the only asset allocation
rule that does not lead to redistribution between new and old insurees in case of a marginal
expansion in a speciﬁc insurance line is vi = ri, i =1 ,...,N.
This is not the same allocation as suggested in Myers and Read (2001). On page 554 it
is suggested that the marginal contribution to default value, di — in our notation, deﬁned
as di
def =
∂PQ
∂PLi
, i.e., the increase in default option value for a one dollar increase in liability
— should be chosen such that di is the same across lines. Via (13), and the relationship
∂PQ
∂PLi
=( ∂PQ/∂qi)/PLi,w eh a v e
di = PQ ×
ri
PLi
, (14)
which, under the ex post sharing rule, is (in general) not constant. However, under the ex ante
sharing rule, we get di = PQ/PL (since ri = PLi/PL), so the equal allocation rule proposed
in Myers and Read (2001) is consistent with the ex ante sharing rule. In the appendix we
show in an example that the cost allocation rule used in Myers and Read (2001) leads to
redistribution between old and new insurees under the ex post sharing rule. This means that
the original prices — which were calculated without taking the possibility of redistribution
into account — are incorrect. Thus, the equal allocation rule, as expected, is not consistent
with the ex post sharing rule.
We now generalize the analysis to the case when δ>0. Following rule (4), the corre-
sponding vi should be used to allocate assets: {vi} = R({ri}). Therefore, in the case of costly
capital, δ>0, the pricing formula becomes:
Pi = PLi + riδA − riPQ. (15)
Thus, we have
Implication 4 For all δ ≥ 0,i fa nex post sharing rule is used, then assets Ai = viA should
be allocated to line i,w h e r evi = ri and ri is deﬁned as in (4). This implies the pricing
formula (15).
We summarize the diﬀerences between the ex post and ex ante in Table 1.
5 Industry structure
We now study how the industry structure – monoline versus multiline – and the related
capital allocations are determined (questions 3 and 4 of the introduction). To analyze these
14V
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15questions given a ﬁxed level of capital and prices — although quite straightforward — may
give quite misleading results. For example, an insurance company choosing to be massively
multiline may wish to have a lower level of capital than the total capital of monoline business
insuring the same risks. Moreover, the risk structure of insurance in a multiline business may
be quite diﬀerent than in a monoline business.
In a competitive market, we would expect such diﬀerences to have pricing implications,
since insurees have propensities to pay diﬀerent amounts for diﬀerent risk structures. There-
fore, before answering the questions of industry structure, we must ﬁrst study how capital,
A, and price, P,a r eendogenously determined in a competitive market:
• Monoline pricing: For an insurance company oﬀering insurance in a single insurance
line in a competitive market, what price will be charged for insurance as a function of
the level of capital?
• Monoline level of capital: For a monoline insurance company, what level of capital will
be chosen?
In section 5.1, we analyze these questions in a competitive market setting with costly capital,
δ>0. Then in sections 5.2 and 5.3, we extend this analysis to the multiline setting. Only
then can we analyze questions 3 and 4 of the introduction.
5.1 Capital and price in the monoline case
So far, we have relied on noarbitrage, ensuring the existence of a risk-neutral expectations
operator. We continue with this general set-up, assuming that the risk-neutral measure, is
equivalent to the objective probability measure.19
In the rest of the section, we focus on the monoline case, N = 1. We assume that ˜ L has an
absolutely continuous, strictly positive, p.d.f with support on the whole of R+. We deﬁne the
default option’s “Eta”, i.e., η(A)=
∂E∗[ ˜ Q(A)]
∂A .S i n c e˜ L has an absolutely continuous, strictly
positive, distribution, η(A) is a continuous strictly negative function on (0,∞) regardless of
the distribution of ˜ L, and the risk-neutral measure (Ingersoll 1987). We study the price of
insurance, P as a function of capital, A. It is straightforward to show that
Lemma 1 The price of insurance as a function of capital, A, satisﬁes the following condi-
tions
i) P(0) = 0,
ii) P (A)=δ − η(A) > 0,
iii) P(A)=PL + δA + o(1),f o rl a r g eA,
iv) P  (A) < 0.
Thus, regardless of the distributional form, P(A) will be a strictly increasing, strictly concave
function with known asymptotics.
19That is, E[˜ L]=0⇔ E
∗[˜ L] = 0 for all risks, ˜ L
16A
P(A)
μL+δA
Figure 2: Insurance premium as a function of capital.
The conditions in Lemma 1 are natural. The ﬁrst condition states that if the insurer does
not put aside any capital, it may charge no premium (anything else would be an arbitrage
opportunity). The second condition relates a small change in capital, A with the change
in premium P. In light of equation (1), it is natural that the change in option value will
enter into such a relation. The third condition shows that as A becomes large, the premium
approach the price of insurance with unlimited liability, PL (as the option value of defaulting
disappears) and costs of keeping capital within the ﬁrm (which will become large as they are
proportional to capital). The fourth condition, which follows as a direct consequence of the
convexity of an option’s value as a function of strike price (see Ingersoll 1987), states that P
is concave.
The optimal (A,P) pair will depend on the preferences of the insuree. We therefore
turn to the insuree’s problem. In a general model with other sources of risk, we would
relate the risk-neutral measure to the insuree’s expected utility function. However, to keep
things simple, we make additional assumptions about the risks. Speciﬁcally, from here on,
we rely on assumptions 6-8 in the introduction, i.e., that insurees are risk-averse, that risks
are nondivisible and idiosyncratic. We also make the fairly standard partial equilibrium
assumption, that the ˜ L-risk is the only source of risk the insuree faces.20
The pricing relation (1) can then be written:
P(A)=μL + δA − μQ, (16)
w h e r ew eh a v ed e ﬁ n e dμQ = μQ(A) = E[ ˜ Q(A)].
Given the competitiveness in the insurance market, the insurer will choose capital, A
that maximizes the expected utility of the insuree, i.e., since the total payoﬀ to the insuree
20Or, in the special case of CARA utility, that any other source of risk is independent of ˜ L-risk.
17is −P(A) − ˜ L +(˜ L − ˜ Q(A)) = −P(A) − ˜ Q(A),
A∗ =a r gm a x
0≤A<∞
Eu[−P(A) − ˜ Q(A)]. (17)
For example, any lower value of A than A∗ would allow a competitor to take over the whole
market by oﬀering a contract with a preferable, that is to say higher, value of A. In general,
A∗ is a set, i.e., there can be multiple solutions to (17).
If δ = 0, it is easy to show that the company will reserve an arbitrary large large amount
of capital. Formally, the solution is A∗ = {∞} and the price is P = μL. We call this the
friction-free outcome, since the insurer never defaults and all risk is transferred from the
insuree to the insurer in an optimal manner. In this case the expected utility of the insuree
is U = u(−μL) and the certainty equivalent of his utility decrease is the same as if he were
risk-neutral, CEu(˜ L)=−μL.
When capital is costly, δ>0, it is not possible to obtain the friction-free outcome. We
assume that the cost of holding capital is small compared with expected losses. Speciﬁcally,
we assume that
Condition 2 CEu(−P(A) − ˜ Q(A)) < −μL(1 + δ) for all A ∈ [0,μ L].
This implies that each risk is potentially insurable in that if an insurer could guarantee
default-free insurance against a risk by capitalizing the expected losses, the agent would be
willing to buy such insurance, paying the cost of holding capital for the expected losses.
In reality, the insurance company would keep a higher level of capital and would still risk
default. In the case of costly capital, the best we can therefore hope for, is for the insuree to
reach a certainty equivalent of −μL(1 + δ). We therefore call an outcome in which an agent
obtains CEu = −μL(1 + δ)t h eideal outcome with frictions.
It is easy to show that the set of solutions to (17) is compact and nonempty. However, it
may be that 0 ∈ A∗, i.e., it is optimal not to oﬀer insurance. In fact, for insurees that are close
to risk neutral, we would expect no insurance to be optimal, since the loss of reserving capital
would always be greater than the gain from reduced risk. We ﬁrst wish to understand in
which situations it is potential for insurance to exist, i.e., when there exists a utility function
such that 0 / ∈ A∗.W eh a v e
Proposition 1
For a risk ˜ L and cost of holding capital δ>0, there exists a strictly concave utility
function, u, such that 0 / ∈ A∗ for an insuree with utility function u,i fa n do n l yi ft h e r ei sa
level of capital, A, such that the price, P,s a t i s ﬁ e sP<A ,w h e r eP is deﬁned in (1).
The “only if”-part of the proposition is immediate, since if it fails, it would be less expensive
for the insuree to reserve the capital than to buy the insurance. Clearly, we would only expect
this to be the case in cases of very large δ. The “if”-part is proved in the appendix.
18We also wish to be able to rank risks when the insurance market is present. Without an
insurance market, stochastic dominance can be used. Given two risks, with payoﬀ −˜ L1 and
−˜ L2,w i t hμL1 = μL2 = μL, Eu(−˜ L1) ≥ Eu(−˜ L2) for all utility functions, if and only if −˜ L1
second order stochastically dominates −˜ L2,
−˜ L1  −˜ L2. (18)
If F1 and F2 are the c.d.f.’s of −˜ L1 and −˜ L2 respectively (with range in R−), we know from
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1973) that second order stochastic dominance is equivalent to the
so-called integral condition:
  t
−∞
F1(x)dx ≤
  t
−∞
F2(x)dx,
for all t<0.
Is there a similar ranking when the insurance market is present? To analyze this question,
we deﬁne ˜ Q1 and ˜ Q2 as the option payoﬀs from default, for risk 1 and 2 respectively. In what
follows, we restrict our attention to cases in which it is optimal for an insurer to buy insurance
and the optimal capital is greater than the expected loss, A∗ >μ L. This is obviously a
situation which that we expect to have in a standard insurance setting.
We recall that
P = δA + μL − μQ, (19)
which we use to rewrite
U = Eu
 
−P − ˜ Q
 
= Eu
 
−μL − δA +( μQ − ˜ Q)
 
(20)
For a given A, (20) implies that regardless of utility function, an investor will be better
oﬀ facing risk ˜ L1,t h a n˜ L2 if and only if
−( ˜ Q1 − μQ1)  − ( ˜ Q2 − μQ2). (21)
Clearly, (21) is not the same as (18), so we can not expect second order stochastic dominance
to allow us to rank risks in the presence of an insurance market. Instead, we have the stronger
condition
Proposition 2 Given an insurer with capital A, if for all t<−μL,
  t+μL
−∞
F1(x)dx ≤
  t
−∞
F2(x)dx, (22)
then any insuree with a strictly concave utility function will prefer to insure risk ˜ L1 over risk
˜ L2 in a competitive monoline insurance market.
We study the diﬀerences in the following example:
19Example 1 Consider the risks ˜ Lβ, β ≥ 1, where the c.d.f. of −˜ Lβ is Fβ(x)=eβ(x+1)−1, x<
1/β−1 that are shifted, reﬂected, exponential distributions.21 It is clear that μL = E[˜ Lβ]=1
and, furthermore, it is easy to check that for β1 >β 2, Fβ1(x) − Fβ2(x − 1) < 0 for x<
−β2/(β1−β2),a n dFβ1(x)−Fβ2(x−1) ≥ 0 otherwise. Therefore
  t
−∞(Fβ1(x)−Fβ2(x−1))dx
realizes a maximal value at t = μL = −1, and it is straightforward to check that
β1 ≥ β2eβ2
is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the conditions in Proposition 2 to be satisﬁed.
This is obviously a stronger condition than β1 ≥ β2, which is what is needed for second order
stochastic dominance.
5.2 The monoline versus multiline business choices
We now have almost all of the machinery to study questions 3 and 4 under the competitive
market assumption. What we still need is a notion of competitive markets in the multiline
setup. We have already used the assumption of competitive markets to completely understand
the pricing and choice of level of capital in the monoline case. Speciﬁcally, we used the
argument to only study outcomes that satisﬁed equation (17). In the multiline case, however,
the analysis is slightly more complex, since several possible industry structures, S,m a yb e
possible, and since there is now a trade-oﬀ between providing utility to multiple agents. Our
restriction will therefore be to require Pareto eﬃciency.
We ﬁrst note that for N risks, ˜ L1,...,˜ LN, and a general industry structure, S =( X,A),
when the ex post sharing rule is used, the residual risk for an insuree, i ∈ Xj,i s
˜ Ki(S)=
˜ Li  
i ∈Xj
˜ Li 
min
⎛
⎝Ai −
 
i ∈Xj
˜ Li ,0
⎞
⎠.
His expected utility is therefore Euj(−Pi(Ai)+ ˜ Ki(S)). Moreover, for a set of agents,
u1,...,u N, each wishing to insure risk ˜ Li, an industry structure, S,w h e r eX = {X1,...,X M}
and A =( A1,...,A M)T, is Pareto eﬃcient, if there is no industry structure S  such that
E[ui(−Pi(Ai)+ ˜ Ki(S))] ≤ E[ui(−Pi(Ai)+ ˜ Ki(S ))] for all i and E[ui(−Pi(Ai)+ ˜ Ki(S))] <
E[ui(−Pi(Ai)+ ˜ Ki(S ))] for some i.22
In a Pareto dominated industry structure, we would expect insurers to enter the market
with improved oﬀerings, thereby outcompeting existing insurers. In fact, we make a somewhat
stronger requirement, that there should be no way to way to improve the situation for a single
insuree by oﬀering that insuree a monoline insurance — even if that makes other agents worse
oﬀ.
21The restriction β ≥ 1 can be extended to β>0 at the cost of allowing for ˜ L to be less than zero. All
derivations go through in this case too.
22Here, Pareto eﬃciency is deﬁned given the (restricted) set of limited liability contracts available.
20Deﬁnition 1
• A Pareto eﬃcient outcome, S,i ss a i dt ob erobust to monoline blocking,i ft h e r ei sn o
insuree, i ∈{ 1,...,N} such that E[ui( ˜ Ki(S))] <E [ui(−P(A)− ˜ Q(A)] for some A ≥ 0.
• The set of Pareto eﬃcient outcomes robust to monoline blocking is denoted by O.
Remark 1 The concept of robustness to monoline blocking is similar to the core concept
used in coalition games, although, in general, O is neither a subset, nor a superset of the
core.23
We are interested in O, since we believe that it may be easier for a competitor to compete for
customers within one line of business, than in for a customers in multiple lines simultaneously.
Technically, the monoline blocking condition allows us to show that O is always nonempty
in (as opposed to the core in our setting).
The following existence and compactness results are straightforward to derive
Lemma 2
•Ois nonempty.
• The set of A’s such that A = Ai for some (X,A) ∈Ois compact.
What can we say about industry structure when there are many risks available? Intu-
itively, when capital is costly and there are many risks available, we would expect that an
insurer to be able to diversify by pooling many risks and — through the law of large numbers
—c h o o s ea ne ﬃ c i e n tA∗ per unit of risk. Therefore, the multiline structure should be more
eﬃcient than the monoline business.24 The argument is very general, as long as there are
enough risks to pool, that are not too correlated. For example, in our model, under general
conditions, the multiline business can reach an outcome arbitrary close to the ideal outcome
with frictions. We have:
23See, e.g., Osborne and Rubinstein (1984). In our model, monoline structures may dominate multilines,
leading to non-cohesiveness, which means that the core may contain Pareto-dominated outcomes. Therefore,
there may be outcomes in the core that are not in O. On the other hand, the core is robust to block-
ing/competition by any insurance company (monoline or multiline) which is stricter than the mono-blocking
condition for O,a n dm o r e o v e r ,O may contain other structures than the partition into one massively multiline
business, so O may contain elements that are not in the core. In the case of cohesive games, the core is a
subset of O, since any element in the core will be Pareto eﬃcient. If, in addition, there are only two lines, the
core is the same as O, since only mono-blocking is possible.
24This type of diversiﬁcation argument is, for example, underlying the analysis and results in Lakdawalla
and Zanjani (2006).
21Proposition 3 Consider a sequence of insurees, i =1 ,2,..., with expected utility functions,
ui ≡ u, holding independent risks ˜ Li. Suppose that u is three times continuously diﬀerentiable,
that u    is bounded by a polynomial of degree q, and that the risks Li are such that
 
   
 N
i=1 μi
 
    ≥
CN for some C>0 and E|Li|p ≤ C for p =4+2 q and some C>0.
Then, regardless of the per unit cost of holding capital, δ,a sN grows, a fully multiline
industry, X = {{1,...,N}} can choose capital A, to reach an outcome that converges to the
ideal outcome with frictions as N grows, i.e.,
min
i
CEu( ˜ Ki((X,A))) = μLi(1 + δ)+o(1).
Remark 2 Proposition 3 can be generalized in several directions, e.g., to allow for depen-
dence. As follows from the proof of the proposition, it also holds for all (possibly dependent)
risks Li with E|Li|p <Cthat satisfy Rosenthal inequality (see Rosenthal (1970)). Rosenthal
inequality and its analogues are satisﬁed for many classes of dependent random variables,
including martingale-diﬀerence sequences (see Burkholder (1973) and de la Pe˜ na, Ibragimov,
and Sharakhmetov (2003) and references therein), many weakly dependent models, including
mixing processes (see the review in Nze and Doukhan (2004)), and negatively associated ran-
dom variables (see Shao (2000) and Nze and Doukhan (2004)). Using Phillips-Solo device
(see Phillips and Solo (1992)) similar to the proof of Lemma 12.12 in Ibragimov and Phillips
(2004), one can show that it is also satisﬁed for correlated linear processes ˜ Li =
 ∞
j=0 cj i−j,
where ( t) is a sequence of i.i.d. random variables with zero mean and ﬁnite variance and
cj is a sequence of coeﬃcients that satisfy general summability assumptions. Several works
have focused on the analysis of limit theorems for sums of random variables that satisfy de-
pendence assumptions that imply Rosenthal-type inequalities or similar bounds (see Serﬂing
(1970), M´ oricz, Serﬂing, and Stout (1982) and references therein). Using general Burkholder-
Rosenthal-type inequalities for nonlinear functions of sums of (possibly dependent) random
variables (see de la Pe˜ na, Ibragimov, and Sharakhmetov (2003) and references therein), one
can obtain extensions of Proposition 3 to the case of losses that satisfy nonlinear moment
assumptions.
The Proposition provides an upper bound of the number of risks that need to be pooled
to get close to the friction-free outcome. For a lower bound on the number of risks needed,
we have the following proposition
Proposition 4 If, in additions to the assumptions of proposition 3, the risks are uniformly
bounded: ˜ Li ≤ C (a.s.) for all i, and Condition 2 is satisﬁed, then for every  >0,t h e r ei s
an N such that lim  0 N( )=∞ and such that any partition that has
CEu( ˜ Ki((X,A))) ≥ μLi(1 + δi) −  , for i ∈ X, (23)
22has |X|≥N (i.e., X contains at least N elements).
Remark 3 Proposition 4 also holds if the condition of bounded risks is replaced by utility
functions having deceasing absolute risk aversion, and the expectation of the risks being
uniformly bounded (E[˜ Li] <Cfor all i) as shown in the proof in the appendix.
We formally deﬁne what an industry structure to be massively multiline as N grows to
mean that the average number of lines for insurers grows without bonds, i.e., limN→∞ N/M(P)=
∞. With this deﬁnition, we have
Proposition 5 Under the conditions of propositions 3 and 4, any sequence of Pareto eﬃcient
industry structures will be massively multiline as N approaches inﬁnity.
These asymptotic results suggest that when there is a large number of essentially inde-
pendent risks that are “small,” the multiline insurance structure is optimal. For standard
risks — like auto and life insurance — it can be argued that these conditions are reasonable.
However, the results also provide an indication of when a multiline structure may not be
optimal:
Implication 5 A multiline structure may be suboptimal
• If there is a limited number of risks.
• If risks are asymmetric, for example, when some risks are heavy-tailed and others are
not.
• If risks are dependent.
One type of risks, that seem to satisfy all these sources of multiline failure is catastrophic
risks. Consider, for example, residential insurance against earthquake risk in the bay area in
California.25 The outcome for diﬀerent households within this area will obviously be heavily
dependent, in case of an earthquake, making the pool of risks essentially behave as one large
risk, without diversiﬁcation beneﬁts. Moreover, many catastrophic risks are known to have
heavy tails. This further reduces the diversiﬁcation beneﬁts, even when risks are independent.
Thus, even though an earthquake in California and a hurricane in Florida may be considered
independent events, the gains from diversiﬁcation of such risks may be limited due to their
heavy-tailedness.
We now show in an example that the previous intuition indeed holds. Speciﬁcally, we
show that asymmetry between risks and dependence of risks makes the monoline outcome
more likely.
25See, e.g., Ibragimov, Jaﬀee, and Walden (2008).
235.3 One versus two lines - An example
The case with general N and risk distributions is complicated. We therefore focus on a special
case: We look at a situation with two insurance line and compare the two industry structures
XSL = {{1},{2}} (monoline) with XML = {{1,2}} (multiline). In the ﬁrst partition, we
know how A1 =( A1,A 2)T should be chosen from our previous analysis, leading to industry
structure SSL =( XSL,A1). In the second partition, there is typically a whole range of
capital, A ∈ [A,A], leading to competitive outcomes, SML =( XML,A). The condition for
the multiline business to be optimal is now that there is an A ∈ [A,A], such that SML oﬀers
an improvement for both agents, i.e., Eu[ ˜ Ki(SSL)] ≤ Eu[ ˜ Ki(SML)], i =1 ,2. We study the
conditions under which this is satisﬁed.
For simplicity, we assume that insurees have expected utility functions deﬁned by u(x)=
−(−x + t)β, β>1, x<0, and that ˜ L1 and ˜ L2 have Bernoulli distributions: P(˜ L1 =1 )=p,
P(˜ L2 =1 )=q, corr(˜ L1, ˜ L2)=ρ.26 Speciﬁcally, we study the case β =1 .5, t =1 ,δ =0 .008
and p =0 .1. We ﬁrst choose q =0 .3 and compare the monoline outcome with the multiline
outcome for ρ ∈{ − 0.1,0,0.1} in Figure 3. The solid lines show optimal expected utility for
insuree 1 and 2 respectively in the monoline case (which occurs at capital levels A1 =0 .7965
and A2 =0 .8997). For the case of negative and zero correlation, the situation can be improved
for both insurees by moving to a duo-line solution, reaching an outcome somewhere on the
eﬃciency frontier of the duo-line utility possibility curve. For the case of ρ =0 .1, insuree 1
will not participate in a duo-line solution, and the monoline outcome will therefore prevail.
In Figure 4 we plot the regions in which monoline duo-line solutions will occur respectively,
as a function of q and ρ, given other parameter values given above (p =0 .1, β =1 .5,
δ =0 .008, t = 1). In line with our previous discussion, summarized in Implication 5, it is
clear that, all else equal, increasing correlation decreases the prospects for a duo-line solution.
Also, increasing the asymmetry (|p−q|) between risks decreases the prospects for a duo-line
outcome.
Thus, in line with Implication 5, we ﬁnd that multiline insurers choose lines in which
• Losses are uncorrelated/have low correlation.
• Loss distributions are similar/not too asymmetric.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper developed a model of the insurance market under the assumptions of costly capital,
limited liability, incomplete markets and perfect competition. We focus on the determination
of 4 key variables for the general case of a multiline insurer: (1) premiums, (2) capital
allocations across the insurance lines, (3) the aggregate amount of capital, and (4) the choice
between monoline and multiline ﬁrm structures.
26Depending on 0 <p<1a n d0<q<1, there are restrictions on the correlation, ρ.O n l yf o rp = q can ρ
take on any value between −1a n d1 .
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Figure 3: Monoline versus multiline industry structure. Monoline outcome will occur when ρ =0 .1,
because duo line structure is suboptimal for insuree 2. For ρ =0and ρ = −0.1, multiline structure
occurs since it is possible to improve expected utility for insuree 2, as well as for insuree 1.
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Figure 4: Regions of q and ρ, in which monoline and multiline structure is optimal. All else equal:
Increasing ρ (correlation), or |p − q| (asymmetry of risks) makes monoline structure more likely.
26The premium setting and capital allocations are based on the no-arbitrage, option-based,
technique, ﬁrst developed in the papers by Phillips, Cummins, and Allen (1998) and Myers
and Read (2001). These papers, however, apply an ex ante rule for allocating the shortfall in
claim paying capacity when the insurer defaults, which has the undesirable features that (i)
it is based on the unobservable initially expected loss and that (ii) it will often require that
policyholders with small expected claims make payments to the policyholders facing large
expected claims. Instead, this paper develops the solution when the shortfall created by an
insurer default is shared among the claimants under an ex post, pro rata, rule based on the
actual realized claims.
The unique contribution of this paper is that it develops a framework to determine the
industry structure in terms of which insurance lines are provided by monoline versus multiline
insurers. We employ an equilibrium concept based on a criterion of Pareto eﬃciency within a
competitive industry. Pareto dominated structures are eliminated by new entrants that oﬀer
a preferred structure. The resulting equilibrium is robust to the entry of any new monoline
provider.
We derive quite strong properties for this equilibrium. First, we ﬁnd that the multiline
structure dominates when the beneﬁts of diversiﬁcation are achieved because the underlying
risks are numerous and relatively uncorrelated. We would expect this condition to hold for
consumer lines such as homeowners and auto insurance. On the other hand, when the risks
are diﬃcult to diversify because they are limited in number and heavy tailed, the monoline
structure may be the eﬃcient form. This condition may hold for the various catastrophe
lines, including natural disasters, security insurance, and terrorism.
27Appendix
An example
Consider two independent risks, ˜ L1 with 50% chance of being −40 and 50% chance of being
zero, and ˜ L2, with 50% chance of being −10 and 50% chance of being zero. The four
states of the world are thus, {(0,0),(−40,0),(0,−10),(−40,−10)}. Further, assume that
the total liability is A = 20, that r = 0, and risk-neutral propabilities coincide risk-neutral
probabilities. Then, the price of ˜ L1 is PL1 = 20, PL2 =5 ,a n dPQ = 25% × 20 + 25% × 30 =
12.5. Now, using (2), the payout in the four states of the world to the two insurees are
{(0,0),(20,0),(0,10),(16,4)}. The sharing rule for the case when both insurees have claims
stems from the fraction of losses being ˜ L1/(˜ L1 + ˜ L2)=4 0 /(40 + 10) = 80%), so 80% of the
total capital of 20, i.e., 16 goes to insuree 1, and the remaining 4 to insuree 2. Thus, the
value of the limited liability insurance against ˜ L1 is 25% × 20 + 25% × 16 = 9, and the value
of the limited liability insurance against ˜ L2 is 25%×10+25%×4=3 .5. This in turn implies
that the premium-to-liability ratios are
P∗
1
PL1
=
9
20
=0 .45,
P∗
2
PL2
=
3.75
5
=0 .75,
which are not equal. Intuitively it is clear that the premium-to-liability ratio is lower for the
ﬁrst risk, as it is more likely to realize losses in the states of the world when the ﬁrm defaults,
and therefore does not pay back the full losses.
We now study the same example in a setup similar to PCA. The key behind the diﬀerences
is that they assume an ex ante sharing rule, whereas we assume an ex post pro rata sharing
rule.
We look at the payouts under (9). Since PL1/(PL1 + PL2) = 80%, (9) implies that the
payouts in the four states of the word in this case are {(0,0),(24,−4),(0,10),(16,4)}, i.e.,
the rule indicates that insuree 2 should pay insuree 1 20% of the option payout of 20 = 4,
in the case where only insuree 1 realizes losses. This obviously violates both assumptions 2
and 3 of the consistency condition. Under the ex ante sharing rule, the premia are P∗
1 =
20 − 0.8 × 12.5 = 10 and P∗
2 =5− 0.2 × 12.5=2 .5, so the premium-to-liability ratios are
equal:
P∗
1
PL1
=
10
20
=0 .5,
P∗
2
PL2
=
2.5
5
=0 .5,
in line with PCA’s argument.
28Cost allocation
The marginal interpretation is that, with a speciﬁc choice of Ai’s (and thereby vi’s), the
marginal default value of increasing exposure to ˜ Li risk is
∂PQq
∂qi
 
   
 
q1,...,qN=1
= riPQ.
We are interested in the bijection between ri’s and vi’s: R : {ri}↔{ vi}.W eh a v e ,f o ra
speciﬁc choice of Ai,
˜ Qq =m a x
 
 
i
qi(˜ Li − Ai),0
 
,
so
˜ Qq
∂qi
   
   
 
q1,...,qN=1
=(˜ Li − viAi)I{−˜ L−A>0},
where I is the indicator function. This immediately implies that
riPQ =
∂PQq
∂qi
   
 
 
q1,...,qN=1
= Price
 
(˜ Li − Ai)I{˜ L−A>0}
 
. (24)
Given an ri, and a pricing rule, Ai can now be chosen to satisfy (24), which deﬁnes the
bijection. This immediately gives us
vi =
Ai
A
,
and in our terminology, the si’s in Myers and Read (2001) satisfy Ai =( 1+si)PLi,s o
si =
Ai
PLi
− 1.
The total surplus, as deﬁned in Myers and Read (2001), is now S = A −
 
i PLi,s ot h e
surplus allocated to line i is Si = siPLi.
Given any choice of ri’s, such that
 
i ri = 1, and the corresponding Ai’s, we have
PQ =
 
i
riPQ = Price
 
 
i
(˜ Li − Ai)I{˜ L−A>0}
 
= Price
  
˜ L −
 
i
Ai
 
I{˜ L−A>0}
 
,
but since Price
  
˜ L − A
 
I{˜ L−A>0}
 
= Price(max(˜ L − A,0)) = PQ, this equation will be
satisﬁed iﬀ
 
i Ai = A.T h u s ,
 
i Ai = A, i.e.,
 
i vi =1i ﬀ
 
ri =1 .
An interpretation of the relationship between the {vi}’s and the {ri}’s is that the {vi}’s
tell us how much the insurer must increase assets, if there is a marginal increase of insurance
in one line. If the insurer currently sells insurance ˜ Li, and then increases risk exposure in line
29i to ˜ Li(1 + Δq), assets will change from A to A(1 + viΔq). With such a change, the value
of the option to default increases (to a ﬁrst order approximation) by PQri × Δq.A n yo t h e r
choice will lead to a redistribution between old and new insurees and will therefore not be
consistent with noarbitrage, as shown in the redistribution example below.
The rule proposed in Myers and Read (2001) is to choose
di
def =
∂PQq
∂qi
   
   
q1,...,qN=1
= PQ
ri
PLi
,
such that the di’s are constant across i’s (see page 559). Clearly, since
 
i ri =1 ,t h eo n l y
way of doing this is to choose ri =
PLi
PL ,w h i c hi st h eri’s suggested by the ex ante sharing
rule.
Redistribution
We show in a simple example that, under the ex post sharing rule, the only asset allocation
rule that is consistent is choosing Ai = riA, i.e., vi = ri.27 Assume that there are two risks,
˜ L1 and ˜ L2, and three states of the world. The state prices are πj, j =1 ,2,3. The losses in
the diﬀerent states of the world are shown in Table 2 below. The default prices for insurance
State, j State price, πj ˜ L1 ˜ L2
10 . 5 0 0
20 . 2 5 1 0 1 0
30 . 2 5 5 0 3 0
Table 2: Example with two risks where ex post sharing rule leads to diﬀerent results than in.
are thus, PL1 =0 .25×10+0.25×50 = 15, and PL2 =0 .25×10+0.25×30 = 10. We assume
that the total reserves (assets) are A = 40. In this case, when the ex post sharing rule is
used, the payout in diﬀerent states of the world are summarized in Table 3. Default thus
State, jP a y m e n t 1 Payment2
10 0
21 0 1 0
32 5 1 5
Table 3: Payments in diﬀerent states of the world.
only occurs in state 3, in which only 40 of the total 80 in liability is paid out, which in turn
implies that the value of the default option is PQ =0 .25×40 = 10. Since the expected value
of losses is PL = PL1 + PL2 = 15 + 10 = 25, the total surplus is S = A − PL =4 0− 25 = 15.
27The asset allocation rule is for marginal expansions in individual insurance lines. Consistent means that it
does not lead to value redistribution between new and old insurees (any redistribution would be inconsistent
with the method used to determine the original price).
30How should the total assets, A =4 0 , be allocated between the two lines? We wish to ﬁnd
v1 and v2, such that A = A1 +A2,a n dA1 = v1A, A2 = v2A. In the case of only one state of
the world in which default occurs, and the ex post payment rule, it is easy to check that our
previous arguments lead to v1 = r1 and v2 = r2, which through our derived rule
ri = Price
 
˜ Li
˜ L
×
˜ Q(A)
PQ
 
, (25)
implies that v1 =0 .625, v2 =0 .375, A1 =2 5a n dA2 = 15. The surplus allocation between
the two lines is then, S1 = A1 − PL1 =2 5− 15 = 10, S2 = A2 − PL2 =1 5− 10 = 5. Finally,
it is easy to check that the price of the cash-ﬂows in Table 3 is P1 =8 .75 and P2 =6 .25.
The allocation implied by v1 and v2 is important in that it provides a rule for how assets
need to change if more insurance in one line is sold. For example, assume that the insurer
increases its exposure to risk 2 by Δq = 10%. In this case, the allocation rule implies that
the total assets need to increase by
v2 × Δq × A =0 .375 × 10% × 40 = 1.5.
Thus, the total assets are now A =4 1 .5, and A1 = 25, A2 =1 5+1 .5=1 6 .5 and the expected
loss of risk 2 is PL2 =1 .1×10 = 11. The new surplus allocation is therefore S1 =2 5 −15 = 10,
S2 =1 6 .5 − 11 = 5.5.
Why is this the right allocation rule to use when the ex post sharing rule is used? Because,
it does not change the price or risk-structure of the payout to the already insured risks, and
it prices the new risk correctly. In short, there are no value transfers between insurers when
the new insurance is sold. With the new risk insured, the total losses are as shown in Table 4
and the payments are as shown in Table 5. The calculations of the payments are identical to
State, j State price, πj ˜ L1 ˜ L2
10 . 5 0 0
20 . 2 5 1 0 1 1
30 . 2 5 5 0 3 3
Table 4: Losses when risk 2’s exposure has increased by 10%.
State, jP a y m e n t 1 Payment2
10 0
21 0 1 1
3 25 16.5
Table 5: Payments when risk 2’s exposure has increased by 10%, and A =4 1 .5.
the previous ones, using the ex post sharing rule. For example, for Payment2 when j =3 ,
31we have 16.5=3 3 /(50 + 33) × 41.5. We see in Table 5 that, in all states of the world, the
payments to risk 1 are identical, and that the payments to risk 2 have increased by exactly
10%. Thus, the price per unit risk is the same as before, and 1.5 is the “correct” amount to
increase assets with under the ex post sharing rule. It is easy to check that this is the only
choice of v1 (and thereby of v2 =1− v1) that has this property (under the ex post sharing
rule). Speciﬁcally, any other choice will lead to a change the prices of the already insured
risks, so that there will be “losers” and “winners” when the company scales up one insurance
line.
The rule proposed in Myers and Read (2001), on the other hand, leads to redistribution
under the ex post sharing rule. Their proposed allocation is such that the option value of
default (PQ = 10) is shared such that r1 = PL1/PL =1 5 /25 = 0.6, r2 = PL2/PL =1 0 /25 =
0.4, which by the relationship
riPQ = Price
 
(˜ Li − Ai)I{˜ L−A>0}
 
,
leads to A1 =2 6a n dA2 = 14, and thereby to v1 =0 .65, v2 =0 .35. Therefore, if insurance
2 is scaled up by 10%, total assets should increase by
v2 × Δq × A =0 .35 × 10% × 40 = 1.4,
so assets are now A =4 1 .4. The option value of default increases with 0.4( r2 × 10% × PQ)
to PQ =1 0 .4.
The payments will be as in Table 6, using identical calculations as in Table 5, but with
A =4 1 .4. However, this implies that the insurance against ˜ L1 has become less worth by
State, jP a y m e n t 1 Payment2
10 0
21 0 1 1
3 24.94 16.46
Table 6: Payments when risk 2’s exposure has increased by 10%, and A =4 1 .4.
the new investments in line 2, as has the value of insurance against ˜ L2 risk for the original
insurees. There has thus been a value transfer from the old insurees to the new ones (assuming
that the price is the same), which is inconsistent.28 Obviously, examples where the eﬀect is
larger can be constructed.
28If the original insurees knew that such a transfer might take place, they would not pay the premium in
the ﬁrst place, since the correct price for the insurance that included transfer risk would be diﬀerent.
32Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: i) and ii) follow immediately from the deﬁnition of P (1). iii) is an
immediate consequence of (1), and E∗[ ˜ Q(A)] = o(1) for large A, follows from E[˜ L]b e i n g
ﬁnite together with the equivalence of the risk neutral and the objective measure. iv) follows
from ii) and that η  > 0 for general distributions (see Ingersoll (1987)).
Proof of Proposition 1
We ﬁrst prove the “only if”-part. Assume that for all A>0, P(A) ≥ A.L e tx− denote
min(x,0). For a given A, expected utility is Eu(−P(A)+(A− ˜ L)−) ≤ Eu(−P(A)+A− ˜ L) ≤
Eu(−˜ L)=Eu(−P(0) + (0 − ˜ L)−), so 0 ∈ A∗.
For the “if”-part: Assume that there is an A such that P(A) <A . Obviously, A>0, since
P(0) = 0 = A. Now, deﬁne the “utility function” uq(x)=( x+q)−. This function is concave,
but only weakly so, and not twice continuously diﬀerentiable, so it is outside the class of
utility functions we are studying. However, it is easy to “regularize” uq and get an inﬁnitely
diﬀerentiable strictly increasing and concave function that are arbitrarily close uq in any
reasonable topology. We can do this by using the Gaussian test function, φ(x)= 1
2
√
2πe−x2/2
and deﬁne φ (x)=φ(x/ )/ . Finally, we deﬁne uq, (x)=uq ∗ φ  =
  ∞
−∞ uq(y)φ (x − y)dy.
Clearly, as     0, uq,  converges to uq.M o r e o v e r ,uq,  is inﬁnitely diﬀerentiable and since
u
(n)
q,  =( uq ∗φ )(n) = u
(n)
q ∗φ ,w h e r eu
(n)
q,  denotes the nth derivative of uq, ,i ti se a s yt oc h e c k
that u 
q,  > 0a n du  
q,  < 0 for all q and  ,s ouq,  belongs to our class of utility functions.
Now, if A>P,t h e nEuP(−P+(A−˜ L)−)=E[(A−˜ L)−] >E [(P−˜ L)−]=EuP(−˜ L), so an
insuree with “utility function” uP is strictly better oﬀ by choosing insurance. However, since
lim  0 EuP, (−P +( A − ˜ L)−)=EuP(−P +( A − ˜ L)−) and lim  0EuP, (−˜ L)=EuP(−˜ L),
for   small enough, the strict inequality also holds for a uP, , which belongs to our class of
utility functions. Thus, insurance is optimal for an insuree with such a utility function.
We also make some straightforward observations: First, if ˜ L has an absolutely continuous
distribution in a neighborhood of 0, then ∂Eu(A)/∂A < 0a tA = 0, i.e., insurees are
always strictly worse oﬀ buying a small amount of insurance than buying no insurance at all.
Second, if ˜ L has a bounded range, with upper bound L,a n d˜ L has an absolutely continuous
distribution function in a neighborhood of L,t h e n∂Eu(A)/∂A < 0a tA = L, i.e., insurees
are always strictly worse oﬀ buying full insurance compared with buying slightly less than
full insurance. These results similar to the classical results on optimal contracts having
deductibles in the insurance literature. Third, if the p.d.f of ˜ L vanishes on an interval [a,b],
then Eu(A)i sc o n c a v ef o rA ∈ [a,b].
Proof of Proposition 2:G i v e nA, the utility of insuring a risk is Eu
 
−μL − δA +( μQ − ˜ Q)
 
=
33Eu[−μL − δA +( ( −˜ L − A)− − E[(−˜ L − A)−])]. Here, we use the notation x− =m i n ( x,0).
Since E[˜ L1]=E[˜ L2]=μL, second order stochastic dominance is therefore equivalent to
Eu((−˜ L1 − A)− − E[(−˜ L1 − A)−]) ≥ Eu((−˜ L2 − A)− − E[(−˜ L2 − A)−]), which in turn is
equivalent to
(−˜ L1 − A)−   (−˜ L1 − A)− + z, (26)
where z = E[(−˜ L1 − A)−] − E[(−˜ L2 − A)−]. Now, if z ≤ 0, (26), is implied by
  t
−∞
F1(x)dx ≤
  t
−∞
F2(x)dx, (27)
for all t<−A, and since A>μ L, (27) is obviously implied by (22).
For z>0, we note that z ≤ μL, so a similar argument implies that
  t+z
−∞
F1(x)dx ≤
  t
−∞
F2(x)dx, (28)
implies the domination, which, once again is implied by (22), and we are done.
Proof of Lemma 2: Second part is trivial, since for a given industry structure, we now
that the set of Pareto eﬃcient outcomes is non-empty, and that the A∗’s and thereby A’s are
compact. Since there are a ﬁnite number of possible partitions of N risks, the set remains
compact (being a ﬁnite union of compact sets) when Pareto eﬃciency is taken over all Par-
titions. For the second part, compactness is preserved by ﬁnite intersections. Uniqueness is
also straightforward: If the partition into singletons (P = {{1},...,{N}})i sP a r e t oe ﬃ c i e n t ,
it is clearly robust to monoline blocking. If it is not Pareto eﬃcient, then there is another
partition that is Pareto eﬃcient, which thereby dominates the partition into singletons. This
partition is then robust to monoline blocking, since there is no way to make an agent better
oﬀ by oﬀering insurance in a monoline business.
Proof of Proposition 3: The condition that u is three times continuously diﬀerentiable with
u    bounded by a polynomial of degree q implies the following uniform Lipschitz condition,
with α = q:
|u  (x) − u  (y)|≤C|x − y|α, for all x,y.
Moreover, condition E|Li|p ≤ C, together with Jensen’s inequality implies that E|Li −
μi|p ≤ C, σ2
i ≤ (E|Li −μi|p)2/p ≤ C. Using the Rosenthal inequality for sums of independent
mean-zero random variables, we obtain that, for some constant C>0,
E|
N  
i=1
(Li − μi)|p ≤ C max
  N  
i=1
E|Li − μi|p,
  N  
i=1
σ2
i
 p/2 
, (29)
34and, thus,
N−pE|
N  
i=1
(Li − μi)|p ≤ CN−p max
  N  
i=1
E|Li − μi|p,
  N  
i=1
σ2
i
 p/2 
≤ CN−p/2 → 0 (30)
as N →∞ . Take A =
 N
i=1 μi. Denote xi = −Li
 
1 − max
 
1 − A PN
i=1 Li
,0
  
= −Li
 
1 −
max
 
1 −
PN
i=1 μi PN
i=1 Li
,0
  
,y i = Li max
 
1 − A PN
i=1 Li
,0
 
= Li max
 
1 −
PN
i=1 μi PN
i=1 Li
,0
 
. We have
Eu(−Exi(1 + δ)+Li − xi)=Eu(μi(1 + δ) − Eyi(1 + δ)+yi). Using Taylor expansions and
Lipschitz continuity of order α for u  , we get
|Eu(μi(1 + δ) − Eyi(1 + δ)+yi) − u(μi(1 + δ)) − δu (μ(1 + δ))Eyi|≤C|yi − Eyi(1 + δ)|2+α,
and, consequently,
|Eu(μi(1 + δ) − Eyi(1 + δ)+yi) − u(μi(1 + δ))|≤C|Eyi| + CE|yi|2+α + C|Eyi|2+α. (31)
Since, by Jensen’s inequality, |Eyi|2+α ≤ (E|yi|2+α)1/(2+α), (31) implies, that, to complete
the proof, it suﬃces to show that
E|yi|2+α → 0 (32)
as N →∞ .
By Jensen’s inequality, we have, under the conditions of the proposition,
E|yi|2+α = E
 
   Li max
 
1 −
 N
i=1 μi
 N
i=1 Li
,0
  
   
2+α
= E|Li|2+α
 
   max
  N
i=1(Li − μi
 N
i=1 Li
,0
  
   
2+α
≤
E|Li|2+α|
 N
i=1(Li − μi)|2+α
|
 N
i=1 μi|2+α ≤
 
E|Li|p
 1/2 
E
 
   
 N
i=1(Li − μi)
 N
i=1 μi
 
   
p 1/2
≤
C
 
E
   
 
 N
i=1(Li − μi)
 N
i=1 μi
   
 
p 1/2
≤ C
 
N−pE
   
 
N  
i=1
(Li − μi)
   
 
p 1/2
. (33)
From (33) and (30) it follows that (32) indeed holds. The proof is complete.
Proof of Proposition 4:
By Taylor expansion, for all x,y, u(x+y) ≥ u(x)+u (x)y+u  (ζ)
y2
2 , where ζ is a number
between x and x + y. Since u   is bounded away from zero: u   ≥ C>0, we, therefore, get
u(x + y) ≥ u(x)+u (x)y + C
y2
2
(34)
for all x,y. Using inequality (34), in the notations of the proof of Proposition 3, we obtain
35Eu(−Exi(1 + δ)+Li − xi)=Eu(μi(1 + δ) − Eyi(1 + δ)+yi) ≥
E
 
u(μi(1 + δ)) + u (μi(1 + δ))(yi − Eyi(1 + δ)) + u  (μi(1 + δ))
(yi − Eyi(1 + δ))2
2
 
=
u(μi(1 + δ)) + u (μi(1 + δ))δEyi + u  (μi(1 + δ))
Va r(yi)+δ2(Eyi)2
2
=
u(μi(1 + δ)) − u (μi(1 + δ))δ|Eyi|−| u  (μi(1 + δ))|
Va r (yi)+δ2(Eyi)2
2
. (35)
Consequently, if (23) is satisﬁed, then
 >u  (μi(1 + δ))δ|Eyi| + |u  (μi(1 + δ))|
Va r (yi)+δ2(Eyi)2
2
≥
|u  (μi(1 + δ))|
Ey2
i +( 1− δ2)(Eyi)2
2
,
and, since δ<1,E y 2
i <    =2  /|u  (μi(1 + δ))|. Take Δ > 0. We have, using Jensen’s
inequality and the assumptions of the proposition,
Ey2
i = EL2
i
 
max
 
1 −
 N
i=1 μi
 N
i=1 Li
,0
  2
= EL2
i
 
max
  N
i=1(Li − μi)
 N
i=1 Li
  2
I
  N  
i=1
Li >
N  
i=1
μi
 
≥
EL2
i
 
max
  N
i=1(Li − μi)
 N
i=1 Li
  2
I
  N  
i=1
(Li − μi) >NΔ
 
≥ μ2
i
Δ2
C2
 
P
  N  
i=1
(Li − μi) >NΔ
  2
.
The above inequalities imply that if condition (23) is satisﬁed, then N must be suﬃciently
large so that P
  N
i=1(Li − μi) >NΔ
 
<
√
  C
Δμ =
√
2 C
Δμ
√
|u  (μi(1+δ))|.
Proof of Proposition 5: Proof by contradiction: Suppose that the proposition is not true.
Then there is a constant integer, C>0, and an increasing sequence N1 <N 2 < ...,s u c h
that Ni/Mi <Cfor a Pareto eﬃcient partition containing Mi elements in the economy with
Ni risks. We have
 Mi
j=1 |Pj| = Ni, where we w.l.o.g. assume that the Pj’s are ordered
in increasing order of size. Let r denote the number of Pj’s containing at most 2C risks.
Clearly, r ≥ Mi/2 since otherwise
 Mi
j=r |Pj| >
 Mi
j=Mi/2+1 2C ≥ 2C × Mi/2=Ni,w h i c h
obviously can not hold. However, from proposition 4, it is clear that for all elements in Pi,
i ≤ r, CEu( ˜ Ki)+μLi ≥  ,f o rs o m eﬁ x e d >0, regardless of N.N o w ,s i n c eMi approaches
inﬁnity as N grows, we can choose N large enough to make r arbitrary large, and the number
of elements in ∪r
i=1Pi thereby also becomes arbitrary large. We can then use the result in
proposition 3 to choose r so large, so that replacing the industry with Nj  risks with a
multiline version, P = {∪r
i=1Pi,P r+1,...,P Mj }, gives for all j ∈∪ r
i=1Pi, CEu( ˜ Kj)+μLj <  .
36Clearly, this is a Pareto improvement, since all agents in {∪r
i=1Pi} are better oﬀ, whereas all
other agents are identically well oﬀ. Thus, the proposed sequence can not be Pareto optimal
and we are done.
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